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Religious freedom, freedom of religious conscience’s worst enemy?
In reading closely a recent celebrated anthology on religious freedom, Politics 
of Religious Freedom (Danchin, Hurd, Mahmood and Sullivan, 2015), I found 
myself both highly stimulated and informed by the discussions therein, 
even when I found myself disagreeing. Yet, one irritating feature of the logic 
of discourse that turns up in this collection kept nagging at me. This would 
ordinarily be a small point but I believe the same oddity turns up in almost 
everything I have read about religious liberty. This is the failure to distinguish 
two senses of the term, “religious liberty.” The first sense refers to institutional 
freedom or sovereignty. I shall apply the convention, “freedom of religion” (FR) 
for this first sense of “religious liberty.” But, a second sense, denoting individual 
freedom of conscience, belief, practice and so on, also circulates in the 
discourse of religious liberty. This, I call “religious freedom” (RF). And, in order 
to avoid confusion with the term, “religious liberty,” I shall reserve that term for 
general uses bringing both “freedom of religion” with “religious freedom” under 
the same umbrella. This means that term, “religious liberty,” as commonly used 
in the literature thus includes both the institutional, “freedom of religion” and 
individual, “religious freedom.”
Why does this distinction matter? Why, in particular, does it matter to 
“freedom of conscience”? Untangling these two usages, so often smuggled 
in under the cover of “religious liberty,” can, I urge, make a difference to 
discussions of freedom of conscience, because freedom of conscience often 
suffers at the hand of freedom of religion, as does religious freedom itself.
In applying this convention, I am also aware that, although conceptually 
distinct, some FR and RF may have practical, material relations to one another. 
Thus, it may be the case that, FR, such as freedom of conscience, or freedom 
to practice one’s religion, are only possible given FR, given some degree of 
sovereignty of the religious community of which a given individual can form 
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a conscience. How then are these two notions of freedom distinct –  both logically, 
and as it happens, in their historical genesis?
The first, “freedom of religion” arose from a Papal declaration of freedom, 
made by 12th and 13th century pontiff, Pope Gregory VII, marking what legal historian, 
Harold Berman called the Papal Revolution. Gregory laid down a statement of Papal 
sovereignty over that of the Holy Roman Emperor. We may be more familiar with this 
principle from Thomas Becket’s opposition to King Henry II. The raison d’être for his 
martyrdom was the defense what Beckett called “the freedom of the Church,” an 
institutional matter. Later, in 1215, in the Magna Carta, King John affirms the very 
same institutional freedom in the following words: “First, that we have granted to 
God, and by this present charter have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, 
that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its 
liberties unimpaired.” (England, 1215) Interestingly, in the decision of the Hosanna-
Tabor case, the justices cited this very clause of the Magna Carta.
Controversy between church and state over religious offices is hardly new. 
In 1215, the issue was addressed in the very first clause of Magna Carta. There, 
King John agreed that “the English church shall be free, and shall have its rights 
undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.” The King in particular accepted the 
“freedom of elections,” a right “thought to be of the greatest necessity and 
importance to the English church.” (Alito and Kagan, 2012)
In the US Supreme Court decision, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC ruling, SCOTUS 
forbade the government from applying equal opportunity employment law to the 
case of a worker fired from her job with the church. The worker had fallen ill, and after 
recovering, wanted to reclaim her job. But, the firing was upheld, and the freedom 
of the church to do so was accommodated at the expense of the civil rights of the 
employee, because the employee was classified as a “minister” by the church.
Critically, neither the Magna Carta itself nor the Hosanna-Tabor case affirms 
individual freedom of conscience, or religious freedom. From Alito’s decision, 
it should be clear about what (or whose) freedom is being affirmed, both by the 
Magna Carta and by SCOTUS. Plainly, it is institutional sovereignty, not personal 
liberty that both documents affirm. It is not, therefore, the right to believe according 
to the dictates of conscience against the authority of his religious community. It is, 
rather, the freedom (or sovereignty) of religious institutions that is affirmed –  indeed, 
often to rein in believers with deviant consciences.
Part of the reason for this logical difference may be the different genealogies 
of these two notions. The differences between institutional freedom of religion and 
religious freedom (of individual conscience) have been traced to their difference 
geneses by historians like John Neville Figgis, Harold Berman, Martha Nussbaum 
and others. Pope Gregory VII’s so-called 12th century “Papal Revolution” asserts the 
freedom of the Church, of religion, while the value of religious freedom (of conscience) 
arises in the liberality of the 17th century Dutch Republic and the colonial experiments 
of Roger Williams. (Berman, 1983; Figgis, 1997; Figgis, 1998; Nussbaum, 2008) 
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It has become commonplace; however in the West, to regard the religious liberty to 
be identified exclusively with sacrality of conscience, the right to believe whatever 
one chooses. Historically speaking, this conception of religious liberty ignores that 
sense of religious liberty understood as the freedom of an institution, people, nation 
and such. It further tends falsely to collapse the notions of institutional freedom and 
freedom of belief or conscience into each other. This results in the irony of Becket 
being held up as a paragon of religious freedom or independent conscience when, 
in fact, he was simply obeying hierarchically derived order in representing the claims 
of the Roman Church against the kingdom of Henry II!
The differences in these two notions of religious liberty are thus at the very least 
historically deep. The depth of logical difference can better be appreciated by the 
frequent way claims to the rights of conscience are asserted against the authority 
or freedom of religious institutions, rather than in their behalf. I submit that while 
institutional freedom of religion may indeed “protect the individual” from a predatory 
State, it may also disadvantage the individual with respect to their church. In the 
Hosanna-Tabor case, the United State Supreme Court’s siding with the church 
over against the rights of an individual freedom of conscience demonstrates just 
such conflict within the notion of religious liberty. Sometimes freedom of religion, 
freedom of a church, for instance, demands compromising of the freedom –  religious 
or otherwise –  an individual’s freedom or well-being. For instance, any number of 
critical Roman Catholic theologians, trying to assert theological Lehrfreiheit at 
Catholic institutions, as well as Roger Williams, William Robertson Smith, Galileo 
Galilei, Ridley and Latimer, Michael Servetus, Thomas Moore, Hans Küng, or the 
Network’s “Nuns on the Bus” might complain of being oppressed by their churches. 
In their cases, the State stood by, exposing them to the predations of their religious 
institutions. In such cases, I think we can fairly say that freedom of religion (FR) 
militates against religious freedoms (RF).
Other burdens of freedom of religion’s unburdening
One might extend this line of thought further and look anew at cases where the 
freedom of religion, that is, of religious institutions, is asserted to the disadvantage 
of the individual enjoyment of civil goods. In the United States, two recent and quite 
different cases, US Supreme Court decision, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) and 
compounded case of Zubic v. Burwell (2015) serve nonetheless as examples of 
the kinds of rulings in which judicial exemptions granted to religious institutions, at 
least on the face of it, disadvantaged individual enjoyment of legitimate civic goods, 
including freedom of conscience, made possible by general laws. Both rulings, and 
adjustments made to them, make these cases complex.
Without wanting grossly to oversimplify them, I simply want to shift the point 
of view from that of a putatively burdened religious institution to the other side. Yes, 
one can understand how the federal mandate to offer contraceptive support to 
women employees of Hobby Lobby, the Little Sisters of the Poor, and so on, might 
conceivably put these organizations into moral straits. And, yes, governmental 
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officials did accommodate the scruples of the religious plaintiffs so that their 
women employees could receive contraceptive services from non-religious, public 
sources. Still, the women involved were “burdened” –  keep waiting through periods 
of uncertainty and deprivation of their legitimate civic goods, guaranteed to them 
under general law.
While these are not cases where the interests of (institutional) freedom of 
religion directly conflict with religious freedom (of conscience), they are cases where 
(institutional) freedom of religion does “burden” the enjoyment of legitimate civic 
goods. Here, it is not freedom of conscience that suffers, but simply the enjoyment 
of common civic goods ensured by general law. An individual citizen’s legitimate 
enjoyment of civic goods that has, thus, been “burdened” by the claim of a religious 
institution to have been “burdened,” in turn, by general law. I should immediately 
note, however, that the courts have commonly tried to balance these burdens upon 
the general citizenry over against those of religious plaintiffs. In the Little Sisters 
of the Poor case, for instance, the Federal government provided the contraceptive 
services from which the nuns sought exemption. The “burdening” of the general 
citizenry seems to be the social cost of freeing religious institutions from “burdens.” 
I believe that the equity of such civic burdening ought to be given further scrutiny.
As to freedom of conscience, I have noted how institutional “freedom of religion” 
differs conceptually from this “religious freedom” –  an individual liberty. This 
difference even extends to one of different historical origins –  religious freedom, the 
free conscience, emerging later in the 17th century Dutch Republic, while freedom 
of religion dated from the assertion of Papal independence from the Holy Roman 
Emperor. Interestingly, freedom of religion (FR) often excludes conscience-linked 
religious freedom (RF), as admirers of Roger Williams, William Robertson Smith, 
Galileo Galilei, Ridley and Latimer, Michael Servetus, Thomas Moore, Hans Küng, 
or the Network’s “Nuns on the Bus” and a whole parade of religious dissenters can 
variously testify.
More frequently than optimal, no attempt is made to distinguish the two –  with 
the notable exceptions in the Danchin, Mahmood, Shackman, Sullivan collection 
of Elizabeth Castelli (Castelli, 2015), Saba Mahmood (Castelli, 2015), Winni Sullivan 
(Castelli, 2015). Readers suspicious of my insistence upon this distinction might 
rightly ask at least two questions straightaway. First, can the two really be separated 
in reality? Does not the one actually require or entail the other? Second, why would 
it make a difference to distinguish the two kinds of discourse? What is gained?
The first question can be answered easily, and in fact has implicitly been so by 
Castelli. She argues that –  institutional –  freedom of religion, such as that enjoyed 
by the Roman Catholic Church, does not necessarily establish religious freedom 
for the individual. In fact, it creates a circle of sovereignty around its member, 
ruling out recourse to, say, US courts, to overrule the Church. Think how this 
ring of sovereignty was breached –  and thankfully so –  in the case of the Catholic 
Church pedophile scandals. Nevertheless, religious freedom means that the 
freedom of the church sanctions a regime of discipline of –  individual –  religious 
freedom, such as in the case of doctrinal dissidents or irregulars. Freedom of 
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religion entails the actual requirement of “submission to the Magisterium,” as 
Castelli reminds us. (Castelli, 2015).
It is important to make this distinction because the only reason Castelli thinks 
her analysis catches the Vatican in a contradiction about religious freedom is that 
she fails to understand the difference institutional freedom of religion from individual 
religious freedom. Of course, in the Catholic context, “Religious freedom emerges 
as nothing more than a mode of shoring up the Magisterium… not a set of values that 
shelters and protects acts of conscience…” (Castelli, 2015) That’s what freedom of 
religion is all about! The Church’s assertion of religious freedom is an assertion of 
institutional sovereignty, the right to rule within its own domain. In fact, this principle 
of institutional sovereignty very principle giving it jurisdiction over the consciences 
of its adherents, and which denies them religious freedom. Castelli has no cause 
for surprise, nor reason to think she has pulled “gotcha” move on Magisterial 
autocracy, by pointing to what is not really an inconsistency at all. Castelli’s dare 
that “bishops should put their money where their collective mouth is and to defend 
religious freedom in their own polity,” reflects Castelli’s fundamental confusion about 
the difference between institutional sovereignty or freedom and individual freedom 
of conscience. (Castelli, 2015) Not only do the two differ, but the sovereignty won 
in freedom of religion is precisely what makes denial of individual religious freedom 
possible and legally unassailable. Of all American heroes of individual religious 
freedom, Roger Williams again knew this best of all, given his own experience of 
religious oppression constructed in the interests of the freedom of religion of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony.
An interesting experiment might be to see which has been the greater oppressor 
of religion, its free exercise and so on –  sovereign –  free –  religious institutions or the 
Erastian state, as so often posed today as oppressor-in-chief of religion? Given how 
long sovereign religious institutions have engaged in censure, ostracism, expulsions – 
or worse –  of dissidents, heresy operations, excommunications, enforced or 
regulated orthodoxy and orthopraxis, regulations daily life, and so on, what are the 
odds? Compared to this history could state limitations upon religion, in retrospect, 
then have been cumulatively greater? The results of such an inquiry would, at the 
very least, be interesting.
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